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Summary 
The article analyses the position of international organisations devoted to economic and employment issues on the role 
of collective bargaining. The article develops a stylized framework to analyse the functioning of international 
organisations, which focuses on their mission and basic expert knowledge, their structure with a political and a technical 
level, and the relationship with the external environment, where the political constituencies and the expert 
communities have a prominent role. Such analytical framework represents a two-fold tool: on one side, it helps 
distinguish between different organisations on the basis of their missions and expert knowledge; on the other, it 
provides an indication of the dynamic factors in the analyses and actions of international organisations. The possible 
sources of transformation in the position of international organisations are found in the limited effectiveness of past 
policy recommendations (a technical and evidence-based check) and in the growing political pressures of specific 
demands (a political and consensus-based development). The article then provides an exploratory analysis of the 
positions of the international organisations under review to conclude that most of international organisations remain 
anchored to their missions and established mainstream economics analyses, with the partial exception of the OECD and 
the notable distinction of ILO. After pointing to the quite different nature of the European Commission, as part of a full-
fledge polity, the article concludes that the emerging more nuanced position on the role of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining among international organisations includes some important elements. In particular, the 
recognition of its potential for social inclusion and cohesion may support the introduction of promotional measures, in 
lieu of the mostly corrective interventions of the recent past. 
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Industrial relations and collective bargaining institutions play a significant role in the regulation of 
the labour market and they also represent a relevant component of democratic systems, since they 
actualise the principle of interest and associational representation. Such two-fold relevance of 
industrial relations, economic and political at the same time, provides different and possibly 
contrasting premises and points of view for their assessment as well as for the identification of the 
specific arrangements that are mostly desirable. With a certain degree of simplification, it is possible 
to distinguish at least three levels for such evaluation: the processes, the output, and the outcomes. 
If industrial relations are a private law- or rule-making system (Dunlop 1993), then it appears that 
the first point of observation will consider the capacity to provide representation, voice and 
participation rights; the second will focus on the level and appropriateness of protections, 
prerogatives and rights; the third will assess distributive effects and economic incentives as well as 
the impact on efficiency and employment and unemployment levels. In terms of scholarship, 
political science would be closer to the first point of observation, labour law to the second and 
economists to the third one. Sociologists, the group I belong to, would try to take all of them into 
consideration. In addition, the political relevance of industrial relations means that value-based 
orientations may affect the level of support it enjoys in the public debate and in policy circles, 
depending on the contingent positions and priorities which prevail in the political landscape. 
Why are these considerations relevant for the objective of this article? Because international 
organisations are quite a composite group of entities and they remarkably differ in terms of focus 
and missions. As intergovernmental organisations and specialised agencies, they usually include a 
political and a technical level and they often cater for single issues. The combination of their scope 
and mission defines the type of technical knowledge that informs their analyses and actions. In 
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practice, this means that each organisation considers collective bargaining and industrial relations 
from a specific point of view and can especially value some of the dimensions mentioned above, 
political participation, legal rights, economic efficiency. Indeed, in some cases, the interest in 
industrial relations may be incidental and the impact of the organisation’s activities on industrial 
relations rather indirect, although it could nevertheless be significant. 
In sum, we should expect the actions of intergovernmental organisations to be framed by their 
institutional mission, the disciplinary knowledge of their staff, and the political consensus or conflict 
among their members regarding the priorities to be pursued in specific periods, which may change 
depending on the political agenda. For these reasons, the positions and actions of international 
organisations may reflect the political ‘spirit of the times’, the established practices of their officers 
as well as the advancements in their technical knowledge. 
Having clarified this general framework, the purpose of this article is assessing whether and to what 
extent it is possible to maintain that the views of international organisations have lately changed 
regarding the role of collective bargaining and industrial relations. The question has become 
relevant because in recent times a number of international organisations, quite different for their 
nature, responsibilities and entitlements, have expressed views which seem to reverse previous 
positions or restore a more favourable stance towards collective bargaining. In particular, 
organisations that had been widely criticised by the trade unions for their disregard of the positive 
role played by worker representation and collective bargaining (see for instance ITUC 2013 on the 
IMF policy recommendations) have apparently started to consider the collective regulation of 
employment relations in a new, more positive light. The OECD with the new Jobs Strategy (2018), 
the European Commission with the new start for social dialogue (2015) and the European Pillar of 
Social Rights (2017), even the IMF with the consideration of wage bargaining as a means to promote 
growth appear to concede a new role to collective bargaining (2016). Does the impression of a 
change in attitudes correspond to more substantial evidence? 
Answering our question will entail an assessment of the degree of support for collective bargaining 
expressed by different international organisations as well as the specific features or components of 
the industrial relations and collective bargaining systems which they regard as relevant. As already 
underlined, we should not expect that all international organisations are concerned with collective 
bargaining and that they represent a unitary block, rather the opposite. Therefore, these notes will 
present a general analysis, which will focus mainly on the most relevant organisations in the field of 
economic and employment issues. Moreover, providing a detailed analysis of the positions and 
actions of individual organisations is beyond the objectives of this article. Other articles in this issue 
are devoted to this kind of study and readers can find there further information and details. 
In this general overview, the first section briefly presents the range and specificities of the 
international organisations that are considered in this analysis and how we can identify ‘their 
positions’. The second section provides a general presentation of the elements that may influence 
the current views on collective bargaining of the various international organisations and the possible 
changes compared to previous periods. The third section includes a discussion of these positions, 
as they emerge from official documents and statements. The concluding section provides a 
response to the question: has anything changed? 
1. Goals, case selection, method, data 
The first objective of this article is to propose an analytical framework for assessing the positions of 
international organisations on collective bargaining, and industrial relations, for what matters. The 
starting assumption is that we cannot consider international organisations as homogeneous 
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entities. They have different institutional missions, they rely on different specialist knowledge, they 
operate in different manners. This means that they will develop distinct viewpoints on collective 
bargaining. In fact, collective bargaining may occupy a key or a marginal position in their institutional 
domain and this will be reflected in the amount of resources devoted to the study and consideration 
of collective bargaining processes and outcomes as well as in the depth and detail of their analyses. 
The second objective is the identification of the position of the various international organisations 
under review about the potential of collective bargaining in terms of the three dimensions outlined 
above: political participation, labour rights, economic performance (basically growth and equality) 
and whether such potential depends on specific collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, we 
are interested in summarising, as far as possible, their diagnoses and prescriptions. We expect that 
the type of organisation (mission, knowledge, operations) influences the viewpoint and in turn the 
assessment of both the potential and the desirable features of collective bargaining, for instance in 
terms of bargaining structure and institutional support it can receive from legislation. 
The selection of cases does not aim to be exhaustive, but it intends to be as inclusive as possible. 
However, the detail of our analysis depends on the relevance that collective bargaining plays for the 
different international organisations. Therefore, although the main international organisations in 
the field of economic and employment issues are included, the analysis is more in-depth and clear 
in the case of entities whose missions comprise a specific focus on employment relations, because 
they are expected to allow for more meaningful analysis, with the specification of the role of 
collective bargaining. If there is no special consideration for the role and potential of collective 
bargaining, the tendency to replicate the standard views of the technical knowledge imbuing the 
organisation will be strong. 
The selection of cases is therefore rather wide and includes the most prominent international 
organisations in the field of economic and employment issues. To start with, the three major Bretton 
Woods organisations shall be included: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank, WB), and the current World Trade 
Organisation (WTO, as the successor of the General Accord on Trade and Tariffs, GATT). Then, the 
two organisations which cover specifically employment issues, as the main or key topic: the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO, with the International Labour Office as its secretariat) and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Finally, the European 
Commission (EC) is also included to take into consideration the debate over the role that the 
European Governance is playing in the field of industrial relations (Marginson 2014; Marginson and 
Welz 2014; Van Gyes and Schulten 2015).  
As an exploratory analysis, our assessment is based on the information and statements included in 
the official documents produced by the international organisations. From a practical viewpoint, 
understanding the stance of an international organisation on a specific issue as well as identifying 
the changes of its positions over time require to distinguish between different levels of analysis. As 
in the case of all corporate actors, complex organisations are made of various roles and offices, with 
specific responsibilities and objectives (Coleman 1990, pp. 421-450). The plurality of ‘natural’ actors 
and organisational sections and segments make it difficult to identify ‘the’ corporate position. This 
means that we have to decide where to locate our observation point, in order to avoid to be 
distracted or misled by the ‘noise’ produced by the various voices and positions which contribute to 
shape the organisational stance. In practice, it may be quite challenging to identify one unitary 
positions, as internal conflicts might remain unresolved and this could be reflected in the presence 
of contradictions and a certain indetermination in the organisation’s position, which may include 
different coexisting views. 
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The risk of misrepresenting the position of the corporate actor is particularly high in the case of 
international organisations, which usually support debates over contested issues and whose 
objectives include promoting evidence-based policy-making that depends on the advancement of 
knowledge in a specific field. The abundance of research papers (all of them with the disclaimer that 
they do not represent the organisation’s view) produced or hosted by many of the international 
organisations under review here often provide the basis for various interpretations. Although they 
certainly represent ongoing discussions, we should not mistake the debate for the position. 
The intergovernmental nature of these actors indicates that we may look for their ‘true’ positions 
in the official key documents or in the declarations produced by their peak governance bodies. The 
relevance of such political texts is utmost and cannot be denied. However, we have to take into 
consideration that these organisations act too, and their actions may be of greater importance for 
employment relations and collective bargaining. Their actions pertain essentially to the technical 
level and can be identified in their policy analyses and recommendations, and in their interactions 
with national authorities. This gives us three main types of documents: 1) the key statements 
produced by the political governance bodies; 2) the analysis included in the principal publications, 
usually as annual reports; 3) the policy analyses and recommendations released to provide guidance 
to actual policy-makers, usually national governments. Of these, the second ones are usually 
available and represent the main source for this article. When available, the third type of document, 
policy recommendations, are particularly illuminating and therefore are included in the analysis. 
Political statements, the first kind of document, may be rather general and need to be made 
operational. For this reason, they are not usually included, since we expect them to be reflected in 
the more technical materials. The only exceptions are two key political documents issues by the ILO 
(2019) and OECD (2018). 
In terms of method, we will use a rather straightforward content analysis which aims to identify the 
following main elements: 
- The criteria to assess collective bargaining, essentially by identifying whether it is mainly the 
capacity to ensure fair terms of employment and working conditions, workers’ voice and 
participation, or economic efficiency and what kind of balance or trade-offs are identified 
between these three main criteria; 
- The structure of collective bargaining which is regarded as more conducive to achieve a good 
‘performance’ of collective bargaining according to the assessment criteria (single-employer or 
multi-employer, coordinated/organised or uncoordinated/disorganised); 
- The institutional features which are considered as supportive of collective bargaining in the light 
of the same criteria, such as extension mechanism, trade union prerogatives, workers’ 
representation bodies; 
- The content of collective bargaining which is regarded as consistent with ensuring a good 
performance. 
Not all of these may be included in the positions of the various organisations. As mentioned earlier, 
we expect that the more central are employment relations in the mission of the international 
organisations, the more detailed is the analysis of collective bargaining. 
 
2. Missions, technical knowledge, political priorities 
International organisations can be located at the intersection of political systems, administrative 
bodies, expert communities, and policy-making. If we concentrate our attention on the operations 
of their permanent departments and technical staff, we can consider them as providers of expert 
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knowledge, administrative capacity and coordination resources to facilitate the achievement of the 
goals and missions identified by the intergovernmental treaties or conventions, which established 
them. In other words, they are stable bureaucracies set up to strengthen the implementation of 
international agreements (Ness and Brechin 1988; Muldoon 2004; Martin and Simmons 2012). In 
this, they basically rely on expert knowledge and they assist the governments by providing 
operational tools and analytical instruments to respond to the questions and provide solutions to 
the problems that fall within the remit of their respective institutional responsibilities. At the same 
time, if we consider instead the political dimension of international organisations – rather than the 
technical one – we should recognise that the ways in which questions and problems are addressed 
by the technical expertise may reflect political priorities and could include a political vision (Reinalda 
2001; Joachim, Reinalda and Verbeek 2008). 
In this sense, international organisations are neither purely political, nor purely technical entities. 
Although the agenda is largely set by the conventions which established them, the political and the 
technical levels shape its implementation. The technical secretariats are often presented and 
regarded as the expression of expert knowledge, but they cannot avoid to reflect the political 
zeitgeist. At the same time, they remain framed in the disciplinary boundaries of the expert 
knowledge they embody. This underlying tension in the relationship between the political and the 
technical dimensions as well as the developments that take place in each of them are the essential 
dynamic elements in the operations of international organisations. 
The two groups of actors are tightly linked, with the political representatives (and the national 
governments in the end) having priority over the technical staff. However, the more technical the 
responsibility of the organisation, the more information asymmetry will characterise the 
relationship, with the possibility that the political representatives are ‘captured’ by the technical 
officers. The different stability of the two groups may also play in favour of technical experts, which 
may stay longer compared to the political representatives. Even though the connections between 
the political and the technical levels are tight, the two levels are to some extent independent, since 
political guidelines have to be translated into operational measures, and there is often some space 
for interpretation as well as a sort of resilience of practices. This means that deviations, anticipation 
and delay between the political declarations and the technical operations can and do take place, 
including for allowing the necessary coordination between the two levels. 
For our purposes, it can be useful to sketch a simplified model of the decision-making, feedback and 
learning processes that take place within international organisations. This can help assess the 
possible reasons and significance of changes in the organisation’s (political) positions and (technical) 
policies, which, as mentioned above, may at times diverge. Within each organisation, we can 
distinguish between the political level, made of representatives of member countries, and the 
technical level, composed of the bureaucracy, officers and technical experts who work in the 
organisation’s secretariat and offices. Outside the organisation, we can similarly find different 
groups or actors: the constituencies of the governments represented in the organisations (voters, 
interest groups, associations, the public at large, etc.) and the expert communities, which are 
relevant for the specific and technical knowledge on which the missions and goals of the 
international organisation are based (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Peters and Peter 2012). 
Such external groups are quite important for the basic processes which involve the two internal 
groups: consensus, which is mainly relevant for the political level, and consistency, which is 
paramount for the technical level. In particular, the latter mean that the actions taken by the 
organisation must be consistent (and up-to-date) with the disciplinary knowledge which informs the 
responsibility and actions of the organisation. In this respect, it should be underlined that 
international organisations are usually required to guarantee political neutrality in their relationship 
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Consensus 
with the national governments and authorities. Therefore, recommendations, actions, and possibly 
sanctions promoted by the organisations must be formally in line with the organisation’s 
entitlements and substantially conform to the analyses and prescriptions of the best technical 
knowledge in the relevant field. 
For the two groups, legitimation mostly derives from different sources and takes a distinct nature: 
political for governmental actors, and technical for the officers. Certainly, the two types of 
legitimation are intertwined, since the officers will depend on the political priorities set at the 
intergovernmental level, while the latter has to rely on the technical knowledge to achieve its goals. 
The relationship between the political level and the constituencies is mediated through the national 
governments, which influence the agenda of the international organisation, within the remit of its 
institutional mission. Therefore, the political representatives in the organisation are somehow 
insulated from the direct pressure of the interests and demands of the constituencies, as they 
directly respond to the national governments. Moreover, the intergovernmental nature of the 
organisation, dilutes the pressure of specific national interests and the presence of a specific 
institutional mission provides a possible protection from particularistic demands. The relative 
autonomy of the organisational environment from direct external pressure may reinforce the role 
of the technical staff, as long as the political level remains divided. So, it means that the political 
level can become particularly important in times of fundamental policy shifts, which involve the 
great majority of the political actors. In ‘ordinary times’, the technical staff (and their disciplinary 
perspectives) are likely to play a leading role in the organisation’s operations. 
Figure 1. International organisation as collective actors. A simplified model 
External environment  Organisational structure 
   
National constituencies  Political level 
   
   
Expert communities  Technical level 
 
 
 
 
 National governments  
   
 
Within the organisation, the relationship between the political and the technical levels can be 
depicted as cooperative and based on guidance (from the political level to the technical one) and 
feedback (mostly from the technical level to the political one), with a view to coordinate the goals 
(set by the institutional mission and the political agenda) with the technical means (policies and 
tools) to achieve them. National governments receive the policy assistance and recommendations 
of international organisations and they are responsible for the implementation at national level. The 
effectiveness (and possibly the efficiency) of the implemented policies are the main criteria used to 
assess the operations of international organisations, by national constituencies and governments. 
The capacity to foster and maintain consensus about the recommended policies at national level 
feeds back into the political cycle of the organisational governance. Similarly, technical staff may 
take into consideration the measured effects of the policies or strategies pursued in the past and 
Consensus:  
Operational goals and 
priorities Consistency:  
Means to achieve goals 
Effectiveness: 
Policy implementation Cooperation: 
Guidance and 
feedback 
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adjust them dynamically, in a trial-and-error fashion, in an open dialogue with their disciplinary 
communities. 
Changes in the organisation’s stance and positions can emerge from these two basic processes, the 
political one based on consensus and the technical one based on consistency. They constitute the 
main channels of organisational learning: the first refer essentially to the input phase (the problems 
that have to be addressed) and the second one to the output side (the policy responses supported 
by the organisation). The link is provided by the impact and effectiveness of the implemented 
policies on the problems to be addressed, as perceived and interpreted in the political and technical 
domains – which may offer different assessments. 
These two processes tend to be adaptive and incremental. Especially the technical analyses remain 
framed in established theories and analytical schemes. More radical changes need a shift in 
perspectives, which happens only at particular junctures, often involving both the political and the 
technical dimensions. The perceived incapacity of existing theories or models to respond to pressing 
demands and the availability of alternative approaches can lead to the emergence of a ‘new 
paradigm’ (as in Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions, but including at a much lower 
scale). The growth of Keynesian economics in the 1930s and of monetarism in the 1970s may be 
associated to similar dynamics. 
3. Making sense of the international organisations’ attitudes about collective bargaining 
The stylised model sketched above may oversimplify the relations and processes which involve 
international organisations. However, it can serve our purpose of identifying the emerging novelties 
in the stance of international organisations over the role of collective bargaining and, more 
generally, industrial relations. Our starting point can be the identification of the main features of 
the organisations under review (Table 1). Most of them focus on economic issues at the macro or 
micro level and use an economic perspective. Only the ILO approaches the issue of collective 
bargaining from the point of view of labour rights ensuring voice and protections. The European 
Commission, as part of a quite peculiar polity, embraces both the economic and labour rights 
standpoints. Therefore, comparing the positions of the ILO, IMF, World Bank and OECD can be 
misleading, if we do not frame our analysis by emphasising the differences in their scope, objectives 
and structures. Similarly, if we want to include the European Commission, we have to acknowledge 
the fundamental distinction between the former specialised agencies and a full-fledge political 
entity. Our analysis must consider the different roles they play and the fact that they operate at 
different levels and with quite distinctive instruments. 
The international landscape is in fact populated by a growing number of organisations, offices and 
agencies, which are involved in the so-called global governance (Held and McGrew 2002). In this 
article, we take into consideration only a small fraction of them and we focus on those covering 
specifically economic and employment issues, with the addition of the European Commission. The 
selection is to some extent arbitrary, but it covers the most important international bodies in the 
field of economic and employment issues. Since the objective is not to provide a comprehensive nor 
a detailed analysis, reference to the major international organisations will serve us well. 
Of particular relevance for our purpose are the respective missions, the key expert knowledge they 
are endowed with, and how they can exert influence on national politics and governments. The 
latter can vary considerably and can help us identify where our analysis should focus. For instance, 
the IMF is responsible to ensure macroeconomic stability and support the international payment 
system. Its actions are based on economic and financial expert knowledge. It operates mainly in the 
provision of credit to governments in order to address significant economic distress, under policy 
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conditionality. The positions of the IMF over collective bargaining are therefore incorporated in the 
requests made to governments in financial difficulties and reflected in the commitments 
undertaken by governments to meet conditionality and included in the Memoranda of 
Understanding signed by the governments and the IMF. Moreover, the IMF regularly issues country 
analyses and recommendations. However, its mission does not include specifically collective 
bargaining and industrial relations. Quite different is the role of the ILO, established as a tripartite 
organisation in 1919, which can provide direct support to governments to design legislation 
concerning labour relations, including industrial relations and collective bargaining, as well as to 
social partners or labour-related civil society associations. 
Depending on their specific missions, international organisations catering for economic issues may 
consider collective bargaining for its impact on macroeconomic stability, economic growth or 
microeconomic efficiency. Their attention is essentially on the wage-setting dimension of collective 
bargaining and less on the normative elements, except for those which may impact on firing costs. 
It is difficult to summarise a long and extensive literature on how collective bargaining can influence 
economic performance. However, as far as macroeconomic stability is concerned, the early debate 
about the benefits of wage moderation to tackle the economic instability of the 1970s and 1980s 
underlined the role of centralised collective bargaining, as part of neo-corporatist arrangements. 
However, according to the hump-shaped hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), decentralised 
collective bargaining structures could perform equally well. Microeconomic efficiency, from a 
standard economic perspective, requires the alignment between wage developments and 
productivity trends, in order to sustain both cost competitiveness and employment – and ensure 
wage moderation by definition. The combination of these analyses would make decentralised 
collective bargaining more desirable from a standard economic perspective. Moreover, institutional 
support in terms of extension measure should be limited and supported by stringent 
representativeness criteria. 
Less orthodox economic analyses consider the impact of collective bargaining for its potential for 
sustaining growth through demand – rather than competitiveness – and for reducing inequality 
(Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012; Baccaro and Howell 2017). From these viewpoints, inclusive 
collective bargaining structures would provide a better environment for economic growth and 
equality and institutional support would be advisable to reinforce the overall effects. With similar 
implications, at the micro-level, the constraints that a high-wage regime and job protections put on 
company strategies have supported the idea that ‘beneficial constraints’ can promote the upgrading 
of the production system and support the so-called ‘high road’ to competitiveness, made of high 
skills, high wages and high quality (Streeck 1997, Traxler, Kittel and Lengauer 1997). These views 
have not been (yet) incorporated in the common standard recommendations, but found some room 
in the analyses of some international organisations (see below). 
The focus on labour rights and social cohesion shifts the attention to the inclusiveness and levels of 
protection as well as on their quality. Centralisation and coordination of collective bargaining 
provide a better basis for achieving such goals than decentralised bargaining. Ensuring participation 
and voice rights is part of the institutional mandate of some organisations. 
Table 1. International organisations: missions, expert knowledge, influence 
Organisation Type Mission Expert knowledge Influence 
World Trade Organization International 
organisation 
Promote the development of an 
integrated, viable and durable 
multilateral trading system 
Economic, Trade Trade agreements, 
dispute 
settlement 
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Organisation Type Mission Expert knowledge Influence 
World Bank Group International 
organisations 
Economic development to end 
poverty and boost prosperity for 
the poorest people 
Economic, 
Development 
Investment and 
assistance for 
development 
projects 
UNCTAD U.N. Secretariat 
body, Permanent 
intergovernmental 
conference with 
secretariat 
Support developing countries to 
access the benefits of a 
globalized economy fairly and 
effectively 
Economic, finance, 
trade 
Analyses and 
technical support 
OECD International 
organisation 
Promote policies to achieve the 
highest sustainable economic 
growth and employment 
Economic, 
regulation 
Policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
decisions, 
standards, 
guidelines,  
IMF International Fund International monetary 
cooperation, exchange stability, 
assistance to correct imbalances, 
under adequate safeguards 
Economic, Finance Conditionality 
ILO U.N. agency 
(tripartite: 
governments, 
workers, employers) 
Labour protection, freedom of 
association, right of collective 
bargaining 
Labour law, 
industrial relations 
Conventions, 
standard setting 
and supervision, 
technical 
cooperation and 
support 
European Commission Supranational 
organisation 
Promote European integration Multi-disciplinary Promotion of legal 
harmonisation, 
regulations, 
policy-
coordination 
 
Besides the organisations’ missions and technical knowledge, the emphasis on the above mentioned 
arguments may vary depending on the emerging demands put forward by the constituencies (the 
political cycle) and on the effectiveness of recommended measures and policies in addressing past 
and current problems (the technical cycle). With a view to identify the potential sources of change 
in the international organisations’ attitudes about collective bargaining, we can compare the 
current situation with the mid-1990s, when the convergence of the political and technical levels on 
deregulation policies was particularly strong. Has anything changed since then? Should we expect 
any shift in the stance of international organisations? There at least three facts which are 
contributing to change the overall perceptions, which pertain to both levels and could support a 
more balanced orientation. 
First, it is quite clear that the de-regulation labour market policies have not fully delivered. The 
spread of non-standard work as well as the reduction in the levels of employment protection and 
the retrenchment of the welfare state has led to mixed outcomes. The most relevant downside can 
be found in the segmentation of the labour market (Barbieri and Cutuli 2016) and in the increase in 
inequality (Piketty 2017). Second, the financial and economic crisis started in 2008-2009 exposed 
the shortcomings and weaknesses of the new economic order and dramatically increased the share 
of those who were losing out, betraying the expectations of increasing standards of living. In 
addition, the experiences with the austerity policies used to absorb the macroeconomic shocks and 
imbalances have added further evidence to qualify (and somehow downgrade) the effectiveness of 
standard neo-liberal prescriptions (Papadakis and Ghellab 2014). Third, the governments found 
themselves under the pressure of financial markets and, in the European Union, of fiscal and 
budgetary discipline, while at the same time the demands for more protection increased. The 
combination of the accumulation of evidence about the drawbacks of market enhancing policies at 
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the technical level as well as the growing demands for protection at the political level provide a 
quite distinct environment for the international organisations compared to the 1990s and it could 
effectively support a revision of the stance about the role of industrial relations and collective 
bargaining. 
In order to assess whether and to what extent this has happened, so far, the next section provides 
a brief account of the position of international organisations, as it emerges from recent publications 
and policy reviews. It mainly focuses on technical advice and assistance, rather than on the political 
dimension, as indicated above. This is because the technical level is involved in analyses aimed to 
assess and recommend policies and, therefore, it can exert a more direct impact on the national 
authorities. The political level is particularly important to understand the changes in priorities and 
perspectives, but the potential impact of international organisations mostly derives from the actions 
taken at the technical level (Peters and Peter 2012). 
4. International organisations and the regulation of employment 
Trying to depict and characterise the missions and instruments of international organisations is 
challenging and requires a significant degree of simplification. However, we want to highlight two 
things. First, we cannot expect to find unitary positions nor trends across different international 
organisations, even those which are more strictly engaged with economic and employment issues, 
because they have different missions and they focus on distinct issues. Second, among the 
international organisations considered here, economic expert knowledge is prevalent, but sectional 
and rather narrow approaches prevail. Therefore, the treatment of the issue of collective bargaining 
is often cursory and incidental and mostly reflects standard mainstream economics. Indeed, 
reference to collective bargaining may be just episodical rather than systematic. As a general and 
very simple test, we have verified whether any mention of collective bargaining has been included 
in the last three years of the main flagship reports of the organisations under review here. As Table 
2 shows, this happened only in a very small number of cases. The OECD, ILO and the European 
Commission, among the bodies selected for our analysis, devote systematic attention to collective 
bargaining. This is not to say that the programmes and actions of the other selected organisations 
are not important for industrial relations and collective bargaining. Actually, the opposite is true, as 
we can see form the following examples. However, the limited presence of references to collective 
bargaining reduces the capacity to identify trends of carry out specific analysis and our discussion 
must be limited to the documents where such reference can be found and it is more meaningful. 
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Table 2. Collective bargaining in the flagship reports of international organisations 2015-2018 
Organisation Flagship report Relevance of collective bargaining Notes 
World Trade Organization World Trade Report Trivial. Collective bargaining 
mentioned once (2017) 
No significant elements 
World Bank Group* World Development 
Report 
Marginal. Some references (2017, 
2018, 2019), but without emphasis 
on its potential or actual role 
The relevance of trade union representation and 
collective bargaining is considered as declining and of 
lesser significance for developing countries (2019). The 
impact of teachers’ unions on student learning is 
regarded as indeterminate: it can be positive or 
negative depending on local circumstances (2018) 
UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Report 
Limited. Important recognition of 
the potential role of collective 
bargaining (2015, 2017), but 
without specific policy implications 
Recognition of the role that collective bargaining can 
play in supporting growth through the contribution to 
aggregate demand (2015) as well as of high wages in 
containing inequality and promote investment and 
productivity (2017) 
IMF World Economic 
Outlook 
Medium. Occasional reference 
(2016), but no systematic 
consideration 
The capacity of collective bargaining to sustain high 
and stable employment is recognised, but it depends 
on the structure (centralisation or decentralisation), 
the presence of flexibility (opening clauses), the design 
of extension mechanisms (based on representativeness 
and public interest), and coordination (in high trust 
environments) (2016, April) 
OECD Employment Outlook Extensive (2015-2018) Various editions underline the links between collective 
bargaining and less inequality (2015), higher skill 
proficiency and utilisation (2016), stronger 
commitment at the workplace (2016), better 
adaptation to local situations, so that relaxing dismissal 
regulations would not involve a loss in employment 
levels (2016). In-depth analysis of collective bargaining 
systems and they role is also included (2017, 2018) 
ILO World Employment 
Social Outlook 
Global Wage Report* 
Extensive (2014-2018) Access to collective bargaining is regarded as basic 
labour right per se and contributing to a number of 
positive results, including growth, equality (reinforced 
by extension mechanisms), democratisation and 
participation at the workplace, productivity growth, 
reducing the gender pay gap. 
European Commission Employment and 
Social development 
in Europe 
Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area 
Extensive (2015-2018) Collective bargaining is seen as contributing to 
sustainable and inclusive recovery (ESDE 2015), 
reducing wage dispersion and ensuring resilience 
through crisis. Social dialogue is considered having a 
“key role to play in tackling the challenges related to 
labour market and social developments and is a core 
component of a well-functioning social market 
economy” (ESDE 2016, p. 189). At company level, it can 
help achieve mutual gains. Lately, similar positions 
were expressed in the Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area prepared by DG ECFIN (2018, 17(3)) 
* 2016-2019 
4.1. The WTO: Specialisation and ‘division of labour’ 
In the field of global trade, it is well-known and debated that trade agreements can and do have an 
important impact on labour relations and they may allow different types of social dumping as well 
as forms of administrative barriers to competition. It is also discussed how social clauses in trade 
agreements may in fact turn into a key protection instrument for labour in a globalised economy, 
where the reach of national legislation may be diminished (Agustí-Panareda et al. 2014, ILO 2015, 
Mückenberger 2015). The WTO does not engage directly with this issue though. It would be 
important and possible to analyse how the rules set within the WTO and their enforcement through 
the adjudication processes impact on labour and collective bargaining, but this goes beyond our 
purposes. Here, it can suffice to mention that the problem of the link between trade and labour 
 12 
standards has been raised within the WTO, especially in the mid of the 1990s, but the answer has 
been to recognise the ILO as the forum to discuss labour standards whereas WTO would be 
concerned with the support of trade liberalisation. The ministerial declaration adopted on 13 
December 1996 at the Singapore WTO biennial meeting states in fact that: 
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we 
affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered 
by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the 
use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, 
particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, we note that the 
WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration (paragraph 4 on core labour standards). 
In the same line of reasoning, at the end of that decade, the Director-General of the WTO, Mr. Mike 
Moore, addressed the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) conference on 
“Globalisation and Workers’ Rights” in Seattle by stating that “I have never seen a contradiction 
between trade and labour because I don’t believe one exists. Open economies, imperfect as they 
are have delivered more jobs, opportunities and security to more people than alternatives. 
Countries that have embraced openness and freedom have increased the real incomes of their 
workers, which in turn has raised labour standards and reduced poverty. Countries that remain 
closed, remain poorer, underdeveloped, cut off from the world of rights and freedoms”. 
With this ‘division of labour’, there are no particular signs that this attitude has change thereafter. 
Even in the joint WTO-ILO publication on Making Globalisation Socially Sustainable there is no 
specific focus on industrial relations and collective bargaining and the analysis mostly concentrates 
on the impact of globalisation on employment, economic volatility and inequality using a standard 
economic framework. Policy responses are mainly devoted to the design of social protection, 
welfare provision and education policies (Bacchetta and Jansen 2011). 
4.2. The World Bank: No specific focus on collective representation and bargaining 
The key international organisation for development, the World Bank, considers work and 
employment from a number of points of view and it is certainly committed to promote the creation 
of more jobs and to the improvement in working conditions as a fundamental component of 
economic and social development. One of its flagship report, the just published World Development 
Report 2019 (World Bank 2019), is dedicated to The Changing Nature of Work and covers how 
governments can act to address the changes which are transforming employment through 
technological change and the global competitive environment by investing in social capital and 
creating an effective system of social security. In particular, the report advances the view that there 
is the need for a new social contract, a new deal for the 21st century. 
The report is complex, detailed, well-written and well-argued. But the collective dimension of the 
regulation of labour is rather narrow and the role of collective bargaining and industrial relations is 
underdeveloped. The basic assumption and conclusion is that public intervention should focus on 
promoting investment in human capital and providing appropriate and inclusive social protection. 
“When social protection is established, flexible labor regulation eases work transitions” (World Bank 
2019, p. 10). Labour relations are depicted as practically inviable for developing countries, where 
informality prevails, and declining in advanced economies. “The current social contract is broken in 
most emerging economies, and it is looking increasingly out of date in some advanced economies 
as well. A new social contract should include investing in human capital to generate more 
opportunities for workers to find better jobs” (ibidem). The recognition that collective 
representation and bargaining may help address the problems of labour protection in a more 
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flexible labour market is accompanied by what seems the acceptance of an inevitable decline. 
“Moving to a simpler core [employment] contract would require stronger collective bargaining 
structures as fewer protections are specified in the law. However, the significance of such structures 
is declining” (p. 118). No specific roles for the trade unions and collective bargaining are envisaged 
in the new social contract for developing countries in the 21st century. 
Similarly, the World Bank Doing Business annual reports include a section on labour market 
regulation, but it is not currently used to calculate the country ranking, after the original index 
(Employing Workers Indicator) was criticised for concentrating on employment flexibility and 
disregarding worker protection (Doing Business Employing Workers Consultative Group 2011). In 
fact, the original indicator focused on four sub-dimensions: the difficulty of hiring, the rigidity of 
hours, the difficulty of redundancy and the redundancy cost” (p. 2). The review carried out in 2009-
2011 by an expressly appointed Consultative Group pointed to the importance of integrating the 
index by considering worker protection and mentioned the fact that “it does not measure aspects 
of the ILO core labor standards— effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of forced labor, the abolition of child labor and the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation” (p. 4). The Consultative Group issued some suggestions to 
amend the indicator and to include the notion of excessive flexibility and excessive rigidity, instead 
of calculating the costs for enterprises, as in the overall approach of the Doing Business 
methodology. The report led to a revision of the labour market indicators, which currently include 
some standard measures of employment protection legislation, such as the regulation of fixed-term 
contracts and dismissal procedures, the regulation of working hours, and certain indicators covering 
wages, premiums and annual leave. Job quality is taken into consideration through the attention to 
equality, maternity leave, sick leave, and unemployment protection. No reference to collective 
representation and collective bargaining is included. 
In this perspective, a recent review of labour market reforms prepared in connection with the Doing 
Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (Kuddo 2018) recognises that “there is no overall blueprint 
to design or adapt labor regulations. Rather, there are different reform paths that depend on 
country characteristics shaped by social, political, economic, and historical circumstances, 
combined with different legal traditions” (p. 57). However, the text tends to reflect a pro-flexibility 
standard economic perspective, as it affirms that “by discouraging firing, employment regulations 
may slow down adjustment to shocks and impede reallocation of labor, with potentially negative 
implications for productivity growth and adaptation to technological change” (p. 58). According to 
the paper, “enterprise restrictions on terminations in many countries are considerable” and 
“countries should consider eliminating or limiting some of these restrictions. Such reform would 
give employers greater flexibility in responding to market fluctuations through their workforce. If 
not, employers will be reluctant to hire workers, and more inclined to operate in the informal 
sector” (pp. 58-59). As mentioned above, this kind of publication (a Jobs Working Paper) does not 
reflect the position of the World Bank, and the usual disclaimer apply. However, it provides an 
indication of the overall debate, in connection with the preparation of one of its fundamental 
publications. 
4.3. UNCTAD: Collective bargaining as a catalyst for recovery 
The role and the assessment of the impact of collective bargaining may change if the focus shifts 
from the micro-level analysis of allocative efficiency in the labour market to the macro-level effects 
of wage dynamics on growth and employment. A policy brief issued by UNCTAD in 2012, based on 
the World Development Report of that year, stresses the importance of wages and of a greater 
income share for labour as a “catalyst for global economic recovery and employment”. The policy 
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brief indicates as a principle for the action of governments that “average nominal wages rise at the 
same rate as average productivity plus the inflation target” and “collective bargaining mechanisms 
can contribute to achieving this” (p. 4). However, due to the mission and operations of UNCTAD, 
there are no systematic follow-ups in the reports of the subsequent years, especially in terms of 
policy recommendations. Table 2 shows that the role of wage setting in supporting economic 
growth has remained part of the arguments put forward by UNCTAD (Trade and Development 
Report 2015, 2017). This represents an important recognition, but it remained without specific 
elaborations, as far as it can be seen from the main analyses and reports scrutinised here. 
4.4. IMF and OECD: From the macro to the micro 
The distinction between the micro- and the macro-level of the analysis can be insightful and relevant 
also when considering the positions of the international organisations which drew the attention of 
industrial relations practitioners and scholars in the first place, that is OECD and IMF. It should be 
recalled, in fact, that economic perspectives at the micro- and macro-level may somehow differ, 
especially because they stress different problems and processes. What can be seen in some of the 
latest documents and analyses issued by OECD and IMF can be probably regarded as a more 
balanced micro-and macro approach, which does not and probably could not abandon the 
prevailing mainstream economics view, due to their institutional mission and main technical 
knowledge. 
We can briefly review their positions as included in recent documents. IMF offers a broad range of 
documents to support our assessment, since we can compare the statements in their flagship 
reports, policy papers and country reports as well as the coverage of collective bargaining in the 
letter of commitment and Memorandum of Understanding accompanying their financial assistance. 
The various types of documents offer a relatively consistent view of the IMF position over time. As 
far as wage setting institutions are concerned, according to a recent IMF discussion note (with the 
usual disclaimer), they should guarantee responsiveness to macroeconomic shocks and productivity 
developments: “bargaining systems that are more favourable to employment than wage increases 
should be encouraged and automatic indexation minimized. Minimum wages need careful 
calibration to productivity realities” (Barkbu et al. 2012, p. 21). If we turn to the IMF flagship World 
Economic Outlook, in the April 2003 issue there is the recognition that bargaining coordination can 
produce different results, depending on the impact of wage developments. If it hinders wage 
adjustments to economic and labour market conditions, it can lead to persistent unemployment, 
whereas it can have a positive impact, if it increases the capacity to control inflation and the 
responsiveness to competitiveness issues. Therefore, wage coordination has positive impacts as 
long as it amounts to wage moderation – especially if monetary policy is in the hands of a credible 
independent central bank (IMF 2003, p. 138). In the April issue of the 2016 World Economic Outlook, 
specific attention is devoted to reforms of collective bargaining that can deliver high and stable 
employment. In particular, the IMF intends to analyse the “macroeconomic performance of 
collective-bargaining systems as a key tool to strengthen the responsiveness of wages and working 
hours to macroeconomic shocks and, ultimately, to help achieve high and stable employment” (IMF 
2016, p. 131-133). One important feature to achieve these goals is “flexibility at the firm level to 
accommodate temporary shocks”, like hardship and opening clauses – as opposed to the 
favourability principle. Flexibility should be well calibrated to avoid adverse effects as increasing 
inequality. Extension mechanism may be important to reduce inequality and avoid competition on 
poor working conditions, but should be linked to representativeness criteria or public interest 
clauses and allow exemptions. Coordination is also important and can improve economic 
performance, especially in high trust environments. In a more traditional line of argument, recent 
country recommendations insist on the necessity of ensuring alignment with productivity levels and 
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differentials across sectors and regions (IMF 2018 on Spain) and advocate decentralisation at the 
company level, including on ground of the alleged limited effectiveness of attempted organised 
decentralisation (IMF 2017 on Italy). Indeed, the 2016 openings of the IMF towards collective 
bargaining stand out so far as an exception, rather than a novel stance. 
Of the international organisations under review here, the OECD is probably the most focused on 
policy analyses and recommendations. Although it also covers activities such as promoting 
international agreements and standards, it is mostly regarded as a source of data, analyses and 
evidence-based reviews aimed to promote effective policies in a number of areas, including 
employment, education, and public administration. Indeed, the 1994 Jobs Study, as stressed above, 
has been remarkably influential in supporting the flexibilisation of labour markets and the 
strengthening of active labour market policies. As testimony of its relevance, the prescriptions 
promoted by the OECD as well as its analysis of regulatory stringency, for instance with the 
Employment Protection Index have attracted a number of criticism and stimulated further analyses 
and literature. The review of the Jobs Strategy, in light of the results of past policies and of new 
emerging issues, has been debated for a number of years, with a first reassessment in 2006 (OECD 
2006). The latest revision of the Jobs Strategy has been recently incorporated in a new document at 
the highest political level (the OECD Council at ministerial level). Considering its prominence, our 
analysis can focus on this key paper (OECD 2018; see the extensive reviews in this issue). In general, 
a significant shift in the overall approach is the somehow novel emphasis on the quality of jobs. The 
main shortcomings of past deregulating policies have been, in fact, the possible segmentation of 
labour markets, with secondary and marginal segments trapped in low-paid and low-security jobs, 
and the increase in earning inequality, especially at the expenses of the low end of the pay scale. 
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, the main policy recommendations of the new Jobs 
Strategy include the promotion of the inclusiveness of collective bargaining systems, which should 
at the same time be sufficiently flexible to accommodate shocks and structural change (OECD 2018, 
p. 10). The document identifies a possible trade-off between coverage and adaptability, since the 
first increases as the level of bargaining moves from the workplace to the sectoral or cross-sector 
levels, whereas the second can diminish (pp. 25-26). According to the OECD, the conditions to 
ensure inclusiveness are complex and they must preserve the basic economic compatibility. With a 
view to support inclusive bargaining systems, policies may be designed to promote social dialogue 
in all types of firms and for all kinds of employment relations. Extension may provide an alternative 
to the presence of social partners with a broad membership basis, but they should be based on 
reasonable representativeness or public interest criteria and envisage exemptions and opt-outs. 
Bargaining systems should be sufficiently flexible to adapt wages and working conditions to difficult 
economic conditions. This may be achieved through organised decentralisation, supported by 
diffused workplace representation and wage coordination (pp. 28-29). 
Compared to the previous 1994 Job Strategy, the consideration of collective bargaining is much 
broader and significant. The new document also underlines the benefits that well-functioning 
industrial relations may bring. On the downside, the new position leaves the impression of a certain 
degree of ‘overspecification’ of the basic features that a well-functioning collective bargaining 
system should show. There is no particular recognition of the autonomous nature of industrial 
relations and it is treated in a rather ‘functionalistic’ manner. Probably due to the OECD mission, 
the role of trade union representation and collective bargaining is recognised as long as it supports 
the performance of the overall economy, with no consideration of the underlying conflicts that may 
characterise the employment relations. At the same time, the new 2018 Jobs Startegy certainly 
provides a new and much broader benchmark which can support and legitimise policy measures 
and claims to support industrial relations systems. 
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4.5. ILO: Collective bargaining as a goal, not a means 
When looking at these outcome-oriented recommendations, the contrast could not be more striking 
with the ILO. The ILO mission is “promoting social justice and internationally recognized human and 
labour rights” and it uses a number of tools to do so, working with governments, employers and 
workers representative. Its basic technical knowledge is rooted in labour law and social protection 
as well as in industrial relations. One of its strategic objectives is actually strengthening tripartism 
and social dialogue. The focus is therefore mainly on the input and process phases: voice, 
representation, participation and joint regulation are at the heart of the ILO approach.  
The ILO perspective has been recently re-asserted in the report Work for a Brighter Future prepared 
by the Global Commission on the Future of Work (2019). This is a programmatic and political 
document, drafted by a special commission set up at the highest level to celebrate 100 years from 
the establishment of the ILO, with the participation of political leaders, international organisation 
officers, trade unionists, employers, NGO representatives and academics. It calls for investment in 
the institutions of work, including “ensuring collective representation of workers and employers 
through social dialogue as a public good, actively promoted through public policies” and states that 
“all workers and employers must enjoy freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, 
with the State as the guarantor of those rights” (p. 12). It builds on the premises that “social dialogue 
and collective bargaining play a key role in building resilience and in adaptation” (p. 33) and that 
“collective bargaining is a fundamental right and a powerful tool for economic success and social 
equity, not least in times of transformational change” (p. 42). 
The recognition and the promotion of the role of worker representation and collective bargaining 
can be found in all positions and documents produced by the ILO. References in the flagship reports 
is common, but it is mainly in the documents which focus specifically on the role of collective 
bargaining that it is possible to find the most detailed analyses. One recent example focuses on an 
important institutional feature of collective bargaining systems, that we encountered in some of the 
analysis of other international organisations: extension mechanisms (Hayter and Visser 2018). The 
book is aimed at policy makers and social partners and considers extension as a “particular form of 
regulation that has a proven track record in reducing inequality and, facilitating inclusion in labour 
markets and addressing the downside of unfair competition” (p. 26). Extension mechanisms also 
show adaptability and the capacity to respond to changing circumstances (p. 27). According to the 
authors, administrative extension continues to represent a useful regulatory tool, undergoing 
renewal, despite the criticism of neoclassical economic views. 
4.6. The European Commission: A political actor 
The European Commission (EC) is a particular case in this review, because contrary to most of the 
other organisations, which tend to be single-issue agencies, the EC is committed to both economic 
integration and social-cohesion, since the principle of social dialogue is enshrined in the Treaties. In 
addition, and more importantly, the European Commission is not a technical body set up to achieve 
certain goals. It is a relevant part of a full-fledge, although peculiar, political entity. Certainly, it 
includes a technical infrastructure, as national polities do, but it cannot be analysed nor compared 
to the international organisations under review here. 
During the recent economic crisis, the EC has been criticised for threatening the autonomy of 
industrial relations and collective bargaining and putting pressure on established national 
bargaining systems (Marginson 2014; Van Gyes and Schulten 2015). This has been linked to the 
strengthening of fiscal and budgetary discipline, which was included in the revision of the European 
economic governance in the early 2010s (the Six Pack, the Two Pack, and the Treaty on Stability, 
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Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union as well as the Euro Plus Pact) 
and led to the implementation of the policy coordination cycle of the European Semester. In 
particular, the EU policy recommendations on wage bargaining (Clauwaert 2016) have been 
criticised for supporting a ‘disorganised decentralisation’ (Traxler 1995), wage erosion and 
increased inequality, without due consideration of existing industrial relations systems. 
Lately, the initiatives on the new start for social dialogue (2015) and the European Pillar of Social 
Rights (2017), taken by the European Commission and sanctioned at the highest political level in the 
Council and Parliament, seem to point to a change in approach and perspective over industrial 
relations and collective bargaining. However, if we use the framework applied above, we cannot 
draw any clear-cut conclusion. At the technical level, the EC combines different competencies and 
knowledge and focuses on both economic efficiency and the establishment and protection of rights, 
including in the field of employment relations. The varying knowledge bases and specific 
responsibilities of the Directorates-General can support differing views. Among the Directorates-
General that are mostly involved in economic and employment issues, the DG for Economic and 
Financial Affairs focuses on policies aimed to ensure growth, financial stability and employment 
creation. As the international organisation covering economic issues, in the recent past, it paid less 
attention to collective bargaining and tended to underline the importance of flexibility in wage 
setting institutions, according to mainstream economics. The DG for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion, on the other hand, has been committed to expand and protect social dialogue. The 
publication series Industrial Relations in Europe, between 2000 and 2014, has consistently 
presented and analysed the features of European industrial relations systems and their contribution 
to a number of policy goals and outcomes. 
Having said that, such a sectional image may be at least partly misleading. On one side, the DG for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion develops its own economic analyses, which include an 
assessment of the role and impact of collective bargaining from an economic perspective, as in the 
Annual Reviews of Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe. On the other, the DG for 
Economic and Financial Affairs has lately incorporated a closer focus on collective bargaining and 
considered specifically the impact of collective bargaining on wage outcomes (DG ECFIN 2018, p. 
20-22). The positive role that collective bargaining can play is recognised, although no specific 
recommendations are put forward. In terms of the collective bargaining structure, the report affirms 
that “more effective coordination between social partners helps achieving macroeconomic goals 
such as increasing resilience, stabilising inflation, tackling unemployment, and correcting external 
imbalances” (p. 21). Similarly, “well-functioning collective bargaining systems also play an important 
role in mitigating inequality, and ensuring that the benefits from productivity growth are shared 
fairly”, while “a stable industrial relations environment plays an important role in delivering the 
trust that is needed to adopt, both in good and in bad times, innovative bargaining solutions with 
the support of the social partners” (p. 22). Whether this is a change in perspective or an episodical 
recognition, as in the IMF case illustrated above, it is not possible to say. Actually, it may respond to 
new and emerging political priorities. 
Indeed, at the political level, the scope of decision- and policy-making is incommensurably broader 
in the European Union compared to the ‘standard’ international organisations, although it must 
conform to the Treaties and respect the intergovernmental dimension of the most important 
decision-making processes. This political character is particularly important because it reverses the 
balance between the political and the technical levels and changes the logic of legitimation. Within 
international organisations, the narrower scope of their goals, (almost) definitely established in the 
instituting conventions and agreements, together with the presence of a specific bureaucracy in 
charge of their implementation often set the balance of power in favour of the technical staff. 
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Similarly, whereas international organisations are expected to act neutrally and they derive their 
legitimation from their technical knowledge, the European Commission and the European Union as 
a whole enjoy a direct and indirect political legitimation, which provides for considerable scope of 
action and the clear prominence of the political level. 
The framework set by the treaties fully recognises the role of social dialogue and the European 
Commission is committed to implement it, for instance through the system of the European Sectoral 
Social Dialogue and in all initiatives in in the social policy field (art. 154 TFEU). In this general and 
favourable framework, the steps taken to relaunch social dialogue and establish a European Pillar 
of Social Rights indicate the persistent commitment in that direction. The other side of the coin of 
the political nature of the European Union is that the prospects of collective employment relations 
have to be built within the EU polity and cannot be taken for granted. This is in marked contrast 
with many single-issue and mostly technical international organisations, whose institutional 
missions and technical knowledge promote stability, as shown by this analysis. 
5. Concluding remarks 
To sum up, it is possible to say that no fundamental paradigm change is seemingly on sight as 
regards the position of the main international organisations covering economic and employment 
issues on collective bargaining. Their missions and expert knowledge establish a framework which 
is difficult to disarticulate. However, something is changing, as the views seem more balanced than 
in the heyday of deregulation policies in the 1990s, especially if we look at the position of the OECD 
and the cooperation which involves the ILO in a broader network among the more economics-
focused organisations. 
Table 3. What kind of collective bargaining for what? 
Organisation Main assessment criteria Collective bargaining 
structure 
Institutional features: 
Extension 
Content: Wage setting 
OECD Economic performance: 
employment levels, 
economic growth, 
capacity to reduce 
inequalities and risk of 
poverty 
Coordinated with 
flexibility to adapt to local 
labour market and 
company economic 
situation 
Extension mechanisms 
subject to 
representativeness and 
public interest checks 
Wage developments in 
line with productivity 
ILO Enforcement of labour 
rights and economic 
outcomes, especially 
reduced inequality and 
fair pay and working 
conditions 
Inclusive collective 
bargaining: coordinated 
multi-employer 
bargaining 
Extension mechanism 
adaptable to local 
circumstances 
Fair wage and 
containment of inequality 
European Commission Economic performance 
and enforcement of 
labour rights 
Coordinated multi-
employer agreements 
with local flexibility 
Extension mechanisms 
with transparent criteria, 
including for exemptions 
Wage developments in 
line with productivity 
* 2016-2019 
Table 3 summarises the idea of collective bargaining that is present in the latest contributions of 
OECD, ILO and the European Commission, there a number of commonalities, but differences persist, 
especially in terms of the potential trade-off between the efficiency- and equality-enhancing 
character of the wage-setting role of collective bargaining. However, distances are probably 
narrower now than two decades ago. The more balanced emerging view reflects the experience 
with more than two decades of deregulating labour markets, which did not fully deliver the 
expected results and the (re-)emerging awareness about the problem of inequality and its 
consequences on both living standards and the prospects of economic growth, through the negative 
impact on aggregate demand. In addition, the benefits of coordinated wage bargaining for 
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macroeconomic stability, in a period of financial instability, has become more apparent. These two 
elements have promoted the revival of some insights of traditional Keynesian demand-side 
economics and of the neo-corporatist literature. As for the political side, the change in the political 
climate, fostered by the economic difficulties and ailing economic growth in many countries, is 
pushing towards some more nation-centred initiatives, which may involve the scaling back of 
economic integration and labour market deregulation. The new situation therefore represents a 
challenge: it contains the recognition of the role of industrial relations and collective bargaining and 
it acknowledges the possible shortcomings of market deregulation, but it may foster a conservative 
turn which may involve the compression of the autonomy of the joint regulation of labour as well 
as of the progressive role that the representation of labour has played historically. Eventually, 
finding the responses is the joint responsibility of social and political actors, hopefully with a little 
help from the international organisations. 
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